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PRIVILEGED JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
REINFORCEMENT OF MALE PRIVILEGE BY THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AND
U.S. v. MORRISON
Jennifer R. Johnson*
"If Congress ... enacted legislation that mandated an end to
sexual discrimination, the Court would have to be less am-
bivalent."l
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year in the United States, violence by men kills
women in numbers equivalent to the lives lost in the terrorist at-
tacks of September 11, 2001.2 In fact, three of four women in the
United States will be victims of at least one violent crime in their
lifetimes.3 Yet, few of those who commit such violent acts are
ever brought to justice. 4 Such injustice is the result of a system
that discounts the harms of violence against women by taking it
less seriously than other crimes, characterizing it as "family
law," and offering little to no monetary relief to redress these
* Editor-in-Chief, Santa Clara Law Review, Vol. 43. J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara. I
would like to thank Margalynne Armstrong for her guidance, editing, and encour-
agement and Stephanie M. Wildman for helping me find the necessary vocabulary
and for her unwavering commitment and careful editing.
1. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Re-
sponse to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265,305 (1984).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (quoting S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36). "Between 2,000 and 4,000 women die
every year from [domestic] abuse." Id. Comparatively, recent estimates place the
September eleventh death toll at 3,044. Fighting Terror and Remembering September
11, MACLEAN'S, Mar. 25, 2002, at 21.
3. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631 (Souter, J., dissenting).
4. See id. at 633 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33, n.30). "[A]n individual
who commits rape has only about 4 chances in 100 of being arrested, prosecuted,




An example can be seen through the life of Christy Brzon-
kala, a freshman at the Virginia Polytechnic and State University
in 1996 who was gang raped by two members of the University
football team.6 After the rape, one of the boys bragged to other
students about his conquest; Ms. Brzonkala dropped out of
school, sought psychiatric help, and attempted suicide.7 She had
reported the attack to the school, which investigated the charge
against the student who had admitted to the rape.8 The school
reduced the charge against him from sexual assault to "using
abusive language" 9 and allowed him to return to school without
reprimand. 10 After hearing about her assailant's readmission to
the University, Ms. Brzonkala cancelled her own plans to return
to school."
Ms. Brzonkala's rapists went unpunished and the state
made no effort to protect her or hold even the confessed assail-
ant responsible.12 In a final attempt for a remedy, Ms. Brzonkala
filed a civil suit in federal court under the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) of 1994.13 Title III of VAWA (hereinafter
Title III) was modeled after other civil rights provisions and
provided a civil rights remedy for victims of gender-based vio-
lence.14 Ms. Brzonkala's case went all the way to the United
States Supreme Court, which struck down Title III as an uncon-
stitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause and Four-
teenth Amendment powers.' 5
Congress' power to regulate commerce is granted through
what is commonly known as the Commerce Clause.' 6 The clause
5. See generally Kelli C. McTaggart, The Violence Against Women Act: Recogniz-
ing a Federal Civil Right to Be Free from Violence, 86 GEO. L. J. 1123,1150 (1998).
6. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
7. See id. at 602-03.
8. See id.
9. See Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Feder-
alism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 121 (2000) (citing Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic




13. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 774.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
15. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. Although the Court discussed both the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment as possible sources of Congress'
power to enact legislation, this comment is limited to the former.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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grants Congress the authority "[t]o regulate commerce with for-
eign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes." 17 Although there is much debate about the limitations of
this power,18 the Supreme Court has held that Congress has the
power to regulate channels of, instrumentalities in, or activities
substantially affecting interstate commerce. 19 After four years of
research and hearings, Congress enacted VAWA because of ex-
tensive findings that violence against women is a national prob-
lem that seriously impedes women from full participation in the
national economy.2°
Ms. Brzonkala's case reached the Supreme Court as United
States v. Morrison.21 The majority in Morrison characterized Title
III as aimed at conduct criminal in nature,22 not at economic ac-
tivity appropriate for Commerce Clause regulation.23 The Court
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 174 (1997).
19. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-63 (1995).
20. Adrienne J. Vaughan, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women
Act as Litigated in United States v. Morrison: The Supreme Court's Sacrificial Lamb to
Reinforce United States v. Lopez, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 163, 173 (2000) (citing Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A De-
fense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2000) [hereinafter Biden 1] (citing numerous Con-
gressional hearings over the four-year period 1990-94)).
21. In December 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Antonio Morrison,
James Crawford, the University, and its comptroller in Federal District Court in
Virginia. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
783 (W.D. Va. 1996) [hereinafter Brzonkala II]. She amended her complaint in March
1996 to allege that Morrison and Crawford acted out of gender animus in violation
of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). See Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 956 (4th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Brzokala
III]. The district court judge split the claims against the school from those against
the students and granted the school's motion to dismiss because he felt Brzonkala
failed to state a sufficient claim of gender bias. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech-
nic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772, 778-79 (W.D. Va. 1996) [hereinafter Brzon-
kala 1). With respect to the claim against Morrison and Crawford, the judge found
that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim, but that the civil rights remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional. See Brzonkala II at 779, 801. A
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court on
both claims, see Brzonkala III at 949, and found the civil rights provision of VAWA
constitutional. See id. at 970 (distinguishing Lopez based in part on the lack of Con-
gressional findings in that case). However, the full Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reheard the case en banc and vacated the panel's decision. See Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Brzonkala
IV]. That court found the civil rights provision of VAWA unconstitutional. See id. at
827-28 n.2. The case reached the Supreme Court on certiorari. See generally United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
22. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
23. See id. at 613.
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warned that Title III would bring issues of "family law" into the
federal courts. 24 However, Ms. Brzonkala's suit was a civil rights
suit, not a criminal one, which sought compensation for her eco-
nomic losses as the result of medical treatment, psychiatric care,
and the education she was unable to complete after a gang rape
by two strangers.25
This comment analyzes the occurrence and reinforcement of
male privilege and gender discrimination in the federal court
system through systematic denial of the problem, using Title III
of VAWA26 and the facts of U.S. v. Morrison as illustrations. Part
II of this comment provides background, first by briefly review-
ing the history of discrimination against women, then by outlin-
ing the connection between violence against women and
discrimination.27 Part II also gives a brief synopsis of the past
sixty years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence leading up to
United States v. Morrison and provides the legislative history of
VAWA.28 Part III provides an account of the widespread gender
discrimination in the federal court system and identifies the sys-
tematic failure of the federal judiciary to recognize and remedy
discrimination within its own walls.29 Part IV examines several
forms of discrimination at work through the Morrison analysis of
Title 111.30 Finally, Part V suggests an approach to Commerce
Clause-based legislation and other jurisprudence that compels
the federal judiciary to avoid reinforcing gender3l discrimination
24. See id. at 615.
25. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1123.
26. In 1990, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. first introduced VAWA in response to
the escalating problem of violence against women. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at173 (citing Biden at 1, 3 (citing S. REP. No. 103-138 (1993)). Over the next four years,
Congress heard testimony on the issue from law enforcement officials, judges, so-
cial scientists, professors, physicians, and victims. See id. Congress concluded that
violence against women is a national problem that seriously impedes women from
participating fully in the commercial life of the nation. Moreover, Congress found
that gender-based violence is a problem that state legal systems had proven unable
and unwilling to remedy. See id. As a result, the United States House of Represen-
tatives unanimously passed VAWA at the end of the 1994 congressional session.
The Act had strong bipartisan support in the Senate, and on September 13, 1994,
President Clinton signed the bill into law. See id.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. This paper focuses primarily on gender, while recognizing the potential es-
sentialist pitfalls in doing so. This concentration on gender is not to set aside the
serious problems of racial (or other forms of) discrimination, but to give gender in-
dependent "recognition time." See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS
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through the courts.3 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Historical Basis of Discrimination Against Women
During the era of the American Revolution, revolutionaries
challenged the laws governing the relations between male sub-
jects and the king and sought individual autonomy for them-
selves.3 3 At the same time, the old English law of domestic
relations was left virtually untouched,3 4 including its traditional
name-"the law of baron et feme"-the law of lord and woman.
35
Central to that law was the practice of coverture, which trans-
ferred a woman's civic identity to her husband at marriage.3 6 As
white men increasingly freed themselves from the constraints of
public patriarchy, they sustained a fully developed, complex
system of law that maintained the private privileges of patriar-
chy as if the Revolution had never even taken place.
37
Early legal studies consisted of reading law treatises and
teachings by practitioners such as Tapping Reeve.38 Reeve
taught that through marriage, the husband acquired absolute ti-
tle to all the personal property of the wife, as well as extensive
power over her real estate. 39 Once such asymmetrical legal rela-
tions were established, 40 personal implications wound their way
through the law.41 The husband's control of all property gave
him such economic and coercive power over the wife that she
could not defy him.42 Under the old law of domestic relations, a
woman's only freely chosen obligation was her husband.43 Once
she made that choice, he controlled her body and her property;
BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, ADRIENNE D. DAVIS & TRINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE
REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 99 (1996) (explaining
the concept and rationale of "recognition time."). See also note 260 (explaining the
concept of essentialism).
32. See infra Part V.
33. See LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 11 (1998).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 12.
36. See id. at 11.
37. See id. at 12.
38. See id. at 13.
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there were relatively few constraints on what he could do with
either.44
The laws as written have changed little even today.45 For
example, married women in the United States had an obligation
to permit their husbands sexual access to their bodies in every
state until New York's marital rape statute of 1975.46 Today's
laws defining rape within marriage remain complex and er-
ratic. 47 The demise of coverture has been slow, accompanied by
an insistence by many scholars that the practice never really ex-
isted, or existed so long ago as to be antique.48 However, it was
not until 1992 that the Supreme Court specifically announced
that it would no longer recognize the power of husbands over
the bodies of their wives.49
B. Violence Against Women & Discrimination
Violence against women has reached epidemic proportions
in the United States. 50 Studies indicate that a majority of women
will be victimized by violent crime in their lifetimes.51 Unfortu-
nately, the statistics are better for rapists, who stand only a 4%
chance of ultimately being convicted.5 2 The effect of violence on
women is substantial, with almost 50% of rape victims losing or
quitting their jobs following the event.5 3
The justice system treats crimes against women differently
than other crimes.54 This disparity is not a new trend, but a
practice that dates back to the nation's English roots.55 In Eng-
land, murder of one spouse by another was criminalized differ-
ently depending on which spouse committed the crime.5 6 The
44. See id. at 15.
45. See KERBER, supra note 33, at 15.
46. See id. at 306.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 307.
50. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 164 (citing U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 633(1995)(citing S. REP. No. 101-545, at 36 (citing E. Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts for
Battered Women: Past, Present, and Future (July, 1990))).
51. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 165.
52. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 633 (citing S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33, n.30 (quoting
H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY LAW 95 (1980)).
53. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634 (citing S. REP NO. 102-197, at 58 (citing Ellis, At-
keson, & Calhoun, An Assessment of Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCH., NO. 3, 264 (1981)).
54. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1150.
55. See KERBER, supra note 33, at 13.
56. See id.
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killing of the husband by the wife was "petit treason," analo-
gous to killing a king, while the killing of the wife by the hus-
band was murder.57 The penalties for petit treason were, of
course, worse than those for murder.58 Further, early common
law prevented married women from participating in the "pub-
lic" economic world outside the "private" sphere of the home.
59
The law declared the two spheres separate and opted to protect
only the public.60 Remnants of this trend can be seen in the ten-
dency of the federal judiciary to assume that all cases concerning
women are family law issues, 61 that is, private issues more fit for
the state court system.62
Crimes against women continue to be seen as private
"hands-off" matters by the nations' courts, 63 even when such
crimes have nothing to do with the family.64 This trend is
stronger yet within families. Examples include judges trivializ-
ing domestic violence with comments such as "[1]et's kiss and
make up and get out of my court," 65 and situations where police
officers urge abused wives to "patch things up" with their hus-
bands.66 However, the reality is that violence against women
has economic and nationwide effects, 67 making it an area appro-
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 22.
60. See id. at 28.
61. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 49 (2000).
62. See, e.g., id. at 86 (regarding "the tendency to associate women with the pri-
vate sphere in all its forms-the sphere of the domestic, the sphere of legal noninter-
vention, the sphere of civil society, and the sphere of the state courts.").
63. See, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997). When Ms. Soto went to
the police as the result of domestic abuse, she was referred to as "Rafi's wife" and
was urged to "patch things up;" the door was left open when she was interviewed;
and she was not given any information about shelters or protective orders, nor was
a domestic violence report filed. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Ending Male Privilege:
Beyond the Reasonable Woman, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1797, 1813-14 (2000). Rafi later re-
turned to the house and killed both of their children and himself. See id. at 1815.
Ms. Soto alleged an Equal Protection violation in federal court, claiming that
women threatened with violence in domestic disputes are treated differently from
other complaints of violence. See id. The court ruled against her, holding that she
had failed to show discriminatory purpose. See id.
64. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 46.
65. See id. at 47. Juries contribute to this bias as well. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at
633 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-197, at 47). "[Forty-one] percent of judges surveyed
believed that juries give sexual assault victims less credibility than other crime vic-
tims." Id.
66. See Wildman, supra note 63, at 1813-14.
67. See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 634 (1995)(Souter, J., dissenting).
140520031
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priate for federal congressional regulation.68
C. Summary of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
grants Congress the power to enact legislation to regulate com-
merce.69 There have been several phases of Commerce Clause
interpretation over the years.70 From 1937 to 1995 the Court
gave more expansive deference to Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause than before that time or since.71 The "test" of
whether Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause power
during those years was whether the activity, taken cumulatively,
had an affect upon interstate commerce. 72 During these years,
the Court did not find even one piece of legislation unconstitu-
tionally enacted under the Commerce Clause.73
The case most commentators consider the farthest reach of
Congress' Commerce Clause power is Wickard v. Filburn,74 in
which the Court upheld the application of a federal law regulat-
ing the growth of wheat for personal consumption. 75 The Court
upheld it because wheat had a cumulative effect on the national
market.76 Also important to the Wickard decision was the
Court's abandonment of strict categories of nomenclature such
as "direct" effects and "production" as limiting categorizations
under which Congress could regulate. 77
One of the "most important laws ever adopted"78 was the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,79 which has been upheld twice by the
Court as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause.80 The cases in
which it was upheld, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States81
68. See id.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. For a detailed history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
71. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
72. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 190.
73. See id. at 187.
74. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
75. See id.
76. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 189.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 191.
79. The Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in places of public accom-
modation. See id. at 191-92.
80. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
81. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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and Katzenbach v. McClung,82 dealt with privately-owned busi-
nesses that discriminated on the basis of race. 83 In those cases,
the Court held that the analysis of whether Congress had ex-
ceeded its Commerce Clause power comprised two questions:
(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that the
regulated activity affected interstate commerce, and (2) if it had
such a basis, whether the means selected to eliminate that activ-
ity were reasonable and appropriate.84
In 1995, the Court dramatically altered Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in United States v. Lopez.85 In Lopez, by a 5-4 mar-
gin, the Court declared unconstitutional the Gun-Free School
Zone Act of 1990.86 The Act had made it a federal crime to have
a gun within 1,000 feet of a school zone.87 The Justices split
along ideological lines, with the majority holding that the rela-
tionship between the activity regulated and interstate commerce
was too tangential.88 The Court outlined three traditional areas
of Commerce Clause regulation: (1) regulation of the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) regulation of instrumentalities, people,
or things in interstate commerce; and (3) regulation of activities
"substantially affecting" interstate commerce. 89 Further, under
the "substantial affects" test, the Court said the proper inquiry
was composed of three questions: (1) whether the regulated ac-
tivity was economic or commercial, (2) whether the legislation
included a jurisdictional element, and (3) whether legislative
findings existed indicating a connection between the activity and
interstate commerce. 90 Under this test the Act in Lopez failed be-
cause the Court concluded that regulating guns in school zones
was not commercial or economic "in any sense." 91 Further, the
statute contained no jurisdictional element and had few legisla-
tive findings to support it.92 The dissenting Justices criticized the
82. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
83. See id. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243.
84. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 192 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379
U.S. at 258-59).
85. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
86. See id.
87. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 194 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a); §
921(a)(25)).
88. See id. at 194. The majority was composed of the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. See id.
89. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-62.
90. See id at 563.
91. See id. at 561.
92. See id. at 560-63.
2003] 1407
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majority for abandoning sixty years of precedent in Commerce
Clause analysis, during which Congress' authority was given
"rational basis" review.93
The Court again addressed the Commerce Clause in United
States v. Morrison.94 At issue in Morrison was Title III of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act (VAWA).95 Using the "substantial af-
fects" test outlined in Lopez, the Court struck down Title III as
unconstitutional in a 5-4 decision split along the same lines as
Lopez.96 Similar to the holding in Lopez, the Court held that the
statute at issue did not govern activity that was commercial or
economic. 97 Citing past cases, the majority indicated that "ag-
gregating" the effects of an activity on commerce, as done to
support congressional enactment of Title III, had been used only
when the activity itself was economic in nature. 98 The analysis
was very similar to that in Lopez, except that Title III had four
years of legislative findings to support it.99 Although the litigant
could provide ample legislative history, the Court held that the
judicial branch made the ultimate decision as to whether con-
gressional legislation was constitutional. 100 Here, the Court de-
cided that Title III was not.10
D. The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act
The Violence Against Women Act was a step toward equal-
ity for women in the courts. 02 Comprised of five titles, VAWA
included Title III, the civil rights provision.103 This provision
93. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 197. Under rational basis review, a law
will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See id.
at 415 (internal citations omitted).
94. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
95. See id. For the facts of the case, see supra Part I.
96. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 615.
100. See id. at 616 n.7.
101. See id.
102. However, as the statute addresses "women as women" (with no reference
to the aspects of the woman's identity such as race or sexual orientation), it runs the
risk of falling into the trap of essentialism. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). See also infra note
260. In some respects my analysis will do the same, as the statute at issue requires.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(b) all persons in the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender... (c) A person.., who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender ... shall be liable to the party in-
1408 [Vol. 43
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furthered one of the stated goals of VAWA-to provide victims of
gender-motivated violence 04 a civil remedy to redress violation
of their civil rights.105 The statute was a civil rights law, mod-
eled after existing civil rights laws.106
Title III was limited in that it only applied to acts of violence
"with a gender animus,"107 which the victim was required to
prove, and supplemental jurisdiction was limited to certain state
law claims.108 While pending in Congress, Title III was one of
the most controversial provisions of VAWA, based on long-
standing attitudes that violence against women was a "private"
matter not suited for the federal courts.109 However, the drafters
jured, in an action for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, in-
junctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as the court may deem
appropriate. (d) For purposes of this section-(1) the term "crime of vio-
lence motivated by gender" means a crime of violence committed because
of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus
based on the victim's gender; and (2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person
or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a
serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the
meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18,
United States Code, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in
criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts
were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction
of the United States; and (B) includes an act or series of acts that would
constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship
between the person who takes such action and the individual against
whom such action is taken.
42 U.S.C. §§ 13981(b)-(d).
104. Although the language of the statute deals with "gender-motivated" vio-
lence, it is commonly accepted that women are largely the victims of such violence.
Violence against women is a form of sex discrimination. See Goldfarb, supra note
61, at 15. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 304 ("Women, not men, are the victims of
sex discrimination, just as blacks and not whites are the victims of race discrimina-
tion."). For a later articulation of this idea emphasizing privilege rather than dis-
crimination, see generally WILDMAN WITH ARMSTRONG, DAVIS AND GRILLO, supra
note 31.
105. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 174.
106. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 53 (citing, e.g., Crimes of Violence Motivated by
Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House of
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 41-42 (1993) (hereinafter 1993
House Hearing)).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1). Section 13981 defines a crime of violence moti-
vated by gender as one committed because of gender, on the basis of gender, and
due, at least in part to an animus based on the victim's gender. See id.
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4). Specifically, Title III excluded any state law
claim to establish divorce, alimony, distribution of marital property, or child cus-
tody. See id.
109. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 7. The concern is that VAWA would disrupt
the "traditional jurisdictional boundaries between the federal and state courts." Id.
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overcame most objections by the inclusion of language limiting
the scope of the remedy." 0 In total, VAWA garnered unanimous
support in the House,"' strong bipartisan support in the Sen-
ate,112 the signature of the President, 1 3 support of the attorney
generals of thirty-eight states," 4 and nineteen separate courts
upheld it." 5
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Courts are venues of discrimination, notwithstanding their
insignias of "equal justice under law."116 Numerous task forces
have studied discrimination in the courts" 7 and all have come to
the same conclusion: equal treatment by the courts is myth, not
reality." 8 Discrimination against women involved in violent
crimes is all but commonplace; women uniquely, disproportion-
ately, and with unacceptable frequency must endure a climate of
condescension, indifference, and hostility." 9
In its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court has left
uncertain what activities qualify as "economic" or "commer-
cial." 20 Dictionary definitions of these terms reveal a field so
at 53 (quoting 1993 House Hearing, supra note 106, at 70).
110. See id. at 54. The Judicial Conference of the United States was satisfied with
the inclusion of a requirement of proof of gender animus, restrictions on the types
of crimes covered, and the exclusion of supplementary jurisdiction for cases involv-
ing family law. See id. at 55.
111. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 173 (quoting Parker Douglas, Note, The Vio-
lence Against Women Act and Contemporary Commerce Power: Principled Regulation and
the Concerns of Federalism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 703, 708 (1999) (citing Patricia Schroe-
der, Stopping Violence Against Women Still Takes a Fight: If in Doubt, Just Look at the
104th Congress, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 377 (1996))).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 173 (citing Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2000) (citing S.
REP No. 102-197, at 36 (1991))).
114. See Goldscheid, supra note 9, at 119 (citing 1993 House Hearing, supra note
106, at 34-36)).
115. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 60.
116. See Judith Resnik, Symposium on Civil and Legal Education: Panel One: Legal
Education, Feminist Values, and Gender Bias: Ambivalence: The Resiliency of Legal Cul-
ture in the United States, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525, 1530 (1993) (discussing gender and
racial bias task forces that repeatedly found discrimination in the courts).
117. See id. at 1529. Resnik documents a total of thirty different task forces as of
1993. See id. at 1528.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1531 (quoting Report of the New York Task Force on Women in
the Courts 5 (1986)).
120. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1781, 1809 (2001).
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broad that nearly any activity Congress might regulate would
fit.121 Prior to Morrison, the Court gave few guidelines. Case
precedent held that growing wheat for personal consumption is
considered "economic or commercial" 122 but keeping guns out of
school zones is not.1 23 The closest analogy to Title III of VAWA
in previous Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the Civil Rights
Act of 1964-creating a civil remedy to address discriminatory
conduct-yet the cases reviewed for constitutionality under that
Act had a very different fate.124 If Title III of VAWA is indeed
analogous to other statutes upheld under a Commerce Clause
analysis, something other than a strict Commerce Clause analy-
sis must have played into the Court's decision. Absent this ba-
sis, discrimination against women and disregard of the
seriousness of gender-based violence claims are left as the re-
maining reasons for not upholding the statute.125
Those who seek to keep issues of violence against women
out of the federal courts expose their acceptance of biased as-
sumptions about women and help to affirm the private/public
dichotomy. 26 In a system where the higher echelons of the judi-
ciary are largely filled with the privileged halves of social pairs
(primarily white males),127 and in a society that listens to what is
said by the dominant members of such dichotomies, 128 the judi-
ciary plays a crucial role in reinforcing incorrect assumptions
about women and the law when it accedes to these views. The
judiciary's failure to recognize and name harmful behavior as
121. See id. Common definitions of "economic" include "[o]f or relating to the
production, development, and management of material wealth," "[o]f or relating to
the practical necessities of life," and "financially rewarding." Id. (citing THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 583 (3d ed. 1992).
122. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
123. See id.
124. Here, I compare gender to race cases in which the Court upheld the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to show how a gender-based statute, although analogous to a
race-based statute, was construed differently by the Court. However, I acknowl-
edge that "[w]hen white women analogize sexism to racism to emphasize disad-
vantages society imposes on women, they (we) must also remember the privileging
granted to whites by that same society." See WILDMAN WITH ARMSTRONG, DAVIS
AND GRILLO, supra note 31, at 97; see also infra note 260. Throughout this paper I do
my best to avoid the pitfalls of essentialism in my discussion of gender without
making any claim of success. "Seeing the privilege of whiteness... takes effort for
those privileged; privilege is our norm." See supra note 31, at 171; see also infra note
260.
125. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1150.
126. See id. at 1143.
127. See Resnik, supra note 116, at 1531.
128. See WILDMAN WITH ARMSTRONG, DAVIS AND GRILLO, supra note 31, at 96.
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discriminatory, even if commonplace, simply reinforces its
power.129
Sex discrimination, like race discrimination, is a part of the
world we live in.130 Congress has recognized this discrimination
as illegal and spent four years conducting hearings and research
and ultimately enacting legislation in an attempt to remedy this
societal ill.131 However, the United States Supreme Court is not
ready to recognize violence against women as a national prob-
lem "economic" enough to warrant protection under Congress'
Commerce Clause power.132 When the Court characterizes vio-
lence against women as "family law," 133 describes a civil rights
statute as a "criminal" 34 law issue, and enacts inherently dis-
criminatory standards of review, 135 all in terms that appear gen-
der-neutral, gender discrimination and the system of male
privilege that support it go unnoticed and legitimized. 36 This
attempt to exclude women from the protection of federal law
demeans the importance of women's issues and threatens to
make women and their concerns invisible in a powerful, elite
setting 37
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's treatment of Title III of VAWA reveals three-
fold discrimination: (1) legal analysis under an inherently dis-
criminatory standard; (2) discriminatory application of the
analysis; and (3) discriminatory timing in enacting the new
analysis.
A. The Economic Standard Itself Is Discriminatory
The distinction between economic and non-economic regu-
lation necessary to sustain power to act under the Commerce
Clause appears gender-neutral. However, women have been
paid less, 138 been taxed more,139 received less recovery in tort,140
129. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 304.
130. See id.
131. See United States v. Morrision, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
132. See infra Part IV.
133. See infra Part IV.C.
134. See infra Part IV.B.
135. See infra Part IV.A.
136. See infra Part IV.
137. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 34.
138. See Laura M. Padilla, Gendered Shades of Property: A Status Check on Gender,
Race & Property, 9 (presented in part at the University of San Diego Journal of Con-
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and had their income and harms undervalued by society and the
court system.141 This economic discrimination remains veiled in
the neutral economic/non-economic language.
Historically, early law gave husbands and fathers property
rights over their wives' and daughters' bodies and property. 42
Early law also restricted women's access to education and sys-
tematically excluded them from lucrative jobs.143 Traditional pa-
triarchal rules not only reinforced women's economic
dependence, but also reinforced women's specialization in care
services.1 44 By maintaining women's dependence on their fa-
thers and husbands, men provided powerful incentive to keep
those fathers' and husbands' needs met.145 Further, family life
was romanticized; by devoting themselves to their families,
women could hold civilization together.146 The ideas behind
such notions were to keep women in the domestic sphere and
out of the market. 47
Overall, women have less money than men.148 In our soci-
ety, money is a source of privilege, and importantly it is the
most widely used yardstick of success and competence. 49 Al-
though the "wage gap" between men and women has decreased
over time, that decrease has slowed in the past decade. 50 At the
current rate, the wage gap will not be closed for another 700
temporary Legal Issues' 2000 Conference, and at the University of Iowa's Journal of
Gender, Race & Justice's 5th Annual Symposium).
139. See Nancy E. Dowd, Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy: Sympo-
sium: A Look at Equality: Women's, Men's and Children's Equalities: Some Reflections and
Uncertainties, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 587,588 (1997).
140. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 197
(1999). "Most empirical studies indicate that women of all races receive signifi-
cantly lower damage rewards than what men ." Id.
141. See id. at 199.
142. See supra Part II.
143. See NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 6
(The New Press 2001).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 12.
147. See id.
148. See Padilla, supra note 138, at 361.
149. See FOLBRE, supra note 143, at xvii.
150. See Padilla, supra note 138, at 9. To add to this, the amount of a woman's
lifetime spent working is usually less than a man's, resulting in lower pensions and
social security. See id. at 12. Such disparity may be seen in the wealthiest class,
with just 11.5% of the Forbes 400 list being female. Remove women who receive
their wealth by inheritance or divorce, and that number drops to 1.75%. See id. at 13.
Similar numbers can be seen at the poverty end of the spectrum. Women's unpaid
work further contributes to this gap. See id. at 371.
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years.'5' Tax rules developed in the 1930s and '40s disadvantage
secondary wage earners, usually women, by taxing their income
at a higher rate, resulting in disproportionately higher taxes for
women.152 Women receive less compensation in tort than men
receive in the aggregate. 5 3 The trend in tort recovery favors or
privileges reimbursement of pecuniary or economic losses, yet
injuries in women's lives more often tend to be classified as
lower-ranked harm or as non-economic loss. 154 In addition,
women's work in the home receives no economic value.155 This
omission keeps women out of the economic sphere. 56
With these aspects of our economy in mind, the harms that
Congress may protect against through the Commerce Clause
have been narrowed by the Court's requirement that activity be
"economic" to qualify as affecting commerce. 5 7 This limitation
on Congressional power is at women's expense. As illustrated
above, women have less money, receive less compensation, and
systematically have their harm classified as non-economic or of
lesser economic consequence. As a result, such narrowing of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence adversely, disproportionately,
and discriminatorily affects women.158 Through this aspect of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as amended by the Court in
the Lopez holding, the Court not only fails to correct for tradi-
tional undervaluations of women's work and harms, but also re-
inforces and magnifies subordination by adding further
discriminatory factors to its analysis.
151. See id. at 10.
152. See Dowd, supra note 139, at 588.
153. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 140, at 197. See also Goldfarb, supra note 61, at
71.
154. See id. at 199. Chamallas also notes that injuries sustained by women could
just as easily be categorized as physical, property-like, or pecuniary, indicating that
such legal characterization is socially constructed and formed by cognitive bias. See
id. at 203. The bases for such biases come from the ancient concept of women as
property. For example, just over a century ago, situations of adultery where the
wife was unfaithful were seen as a property-like loss for the husband, yet when the
husband was unfaithful, the woman's only losses were emotional. See id. at 203 (cit-
ing Lynch v. Knight, IX H.L. Cas. 576, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861)). Even in a case of a
victory over severely sexually explicit and degrading images of women in the
workplace, the female plaintiff was denied monetary damages. See Wildman, supra
note 63, at 1804 (citing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-
98 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
155. See FOLBRE, supra note 143, at 12.
156. See id.
157. See supra Part II.
158. See generally FOLBRE, supra note 143.
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B. Discriminatory Application of the Commerce Clause Analysis
The decision in many Supreme Court cases has turned upon
how the Court opted to characterize the harm at issue.159 As a
result, it is important to consider the Court's characterization in
Morrison of Title III as remedying a "non-economic," "criminal"
area of "family law." 160 These discriminatory characterizations
are what ultimately disqualify the statute, not case precedent.'61
Under the hypothetical assumption that the test in Lopez is the
appropriate test, Title III should have been held constitutional.
1. "Non-economic"
In Lopez, the Court said whether a regulated activity was
economic or commercial was the first essential component to
finding congressional power to act.162 Pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power, Congress enacted VAWA after finding that
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial ad-
verse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential vic-
tims from interstate travel, from engaging in employment in
interstate business, and from transacting business in interstate
commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the
demand for interstate products. 163 Congress cited the annual
cost of harm caused by domestic violence (a smaller subset of
the whole of violence against women) as $3 billion in 1990164 and
$5 to $10 billion in 1993.165 Even with such convincing numbers
to back up the economic impact and thus the necessity of enact-
ing Title III, the Court characterized the reach of the statute as
159. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court de-
clared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and distribution of con-
traceptives, characterizing the right as the right to privacy in the marital bedroom.
However, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court declared constitu-
tional a Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy. Instead of characterizing the right as
privacy in the home and personal relationships (much like Griswold), the Court
addressed it as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Needless to say, it is
much more difficult to find precedent supporting the upholding of the rights of
homosexuals than it is to find the right to privacy in the home. See Professor Brad-
ley W. Joondeph, Lecture at Santa Clara University School of Law (Nov. 13, 2001)
[hereinafter Joondeph Lecture].
160. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
161. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1123.
162. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
163. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 103-711, p. 385 (1994)).
164. See id. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. 101-545).
165. See id. (citing S. REP. 103-138, at 41).
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non-economic. 66 The majority distinguished Title III using an
artificial categorization plausible only through a retrospective,
distorted reading of Commerce Clause precedent. Further, the
Court held that the effects on commerce cited to support enact-
ment of the statute were too tangential to the activity regu-
lated167
In Morrison, the majority cites Wickard v. Filburn168 as a case
in which the activity regulated qualified as "economic." 169 The
plaintiff in Wickard was a farmer and the "economic activity" at
issue was sowing less than twelve acres of wheat.170 Termed
"economic" (in hindsight) because the Agricultural Act at issue
was meant to stabilize prices of wheat,171 the premise was that if
Wickard did not grow wheat for his own consumption, he
would have to buy it in the market. 72 However, the lone
farmer's activity itself cannot rightly be termed "economic" in
the context of the Court's definition, as it was both private and
non-commercial. 173 It is only the effects of Wickard's activity on
commerce, in the aggregate, that may rightly be termed eco-
nomic.174 The majority in Morrison ignores this fact, claiming
that in prior cases permitting "aggregating," the activity itself
was always economic.1 75 Even a cursory reading of Wickard in-
dicates that that statement is false.
Katzenbach v. McClung 76 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States,'77 which upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964, were
also said to be economic in retrospect, based upon the fact that
the challenged provisions of the Act related to the activities of
166. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
167. See id.
168. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
169. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
170. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 189.
171. See id.
172. See id. However, a similar thing could be said about something as seem-
ingly "non-economic" as a woman's unpaid labor in the home: it must also be eco-
nomic under this analysis, because if the woman did not perform them, such
services would have to be purchased in the market as well. See id.
173. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 190.
174. See id.
175. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (1995)(emphasis added). Ironically, it
was in Wickard that the Court struck down such strict categories of nomenclature.
See generally Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
176. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
177. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1964)
(recognizing "the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial dis-
crimination has had on commercial intercourse.").
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restaurants and hotels.178 Although both cases presented a
stronger finding of aggregated economic effects, whether the
regulated activity was economic was not central to the holding.179
The activity regulated, namely discrimination, was both private
and non-economic in the traditional meanings of those terms. 80
These decisions were based on the fact that racial discrimination
had been shown to have effects that were economic.18
The legislative record supporting VAWA was "far more vo-
luminous" than that compiled and found sufficient in both
Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta.182 In fact, the Court upheld ac-
tivities in prior cases with much smaller dollar figures than
those Congress produced as support for VAWA. 183 Equally im-
portant, Congress showed that gender-based violence in the
1990s operated in a manner similar to racial discrimination in
the 1960s-reducing the mobility of employees and their produc-
tion and consumption of goods shipped in interstate commerce-
activities not considered too remotely tangential in the Civil
Rights Act cases.1 4
The activities regulated by Title III are not less "economic"
in nature than statutes in prior case law. The effects in Wickard185
were just as tangential as those in Morrison, if not more so, and
the discrimination in Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta were akin to
that Congress sought to regulate by enacting VAWA.186 Con-
gress chose to legislate in the field of gender motivated crimes
for many of the same reasons as it chose to legislate over racial
discrimination in the 1960s: the aggregate effects substantially
affect the national economy. 8 7 Further, the connection between
violence against women and interstate commerce is no less at-
tenuated than the connection between racial discrimination and
178. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
179. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 190 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241
(1964)).
180. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1140.
181. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 190.
182. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 635 (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 325 n.l (1981)) (stating
that corn production with a value of $5.16 million "surely is not an insignificant
amount of commerce").
184. See id. at 635-36. Notably, the Court of today has a very different composi-
tion than the one in the 1960s.
185. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 190.
186. See id. at 195.
187. See id. at 188.
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interstate commerce.188 Following Heart of Atlanta and Katzen-
bach, the fact that fear of gender-based crime affects women's
full participation in interstate commerce means that they too will
be deterred from staying at hotels and eating at restaurants.18 9
The majority in Morrison disregarded the magnitude of the prob-
lem of gender-based violence in society today, much in the same
way the problem of racial discrimination went unnoticed by the
Court for years.190 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 cases, namely
Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach, were upheld under the Com-
merce Clause because of a societal need for a federal remedy.1 91
Thus the same standard should apply for the equally pressing
need for federal regulation with respect to gender-based vio-
lence.192
If the "economic" distinctions between Morrison and Com-
merce Clause precedent do not hold up, it follows that some-
thing else must have governed the Court's decision. As
illustrated, a different standard was applied in Morrison, while
the Court purported to use the same analysis it had in prior
cases.193 More specifically, the Court changed the standard to
require that the regulated activity be economic to aggregate the
affects of an activity on commerce, whereas prior Commerce
Clause jurisprudence allowed the effects themselves to be eco-
nomic.194 By enacting and applying a different standard for dis-
crimination against women through violence than it did for
racial discrimination in the Civil Rights Act cases, the Court
deems sex discrimination a less egregious social ill than race dis-
crimination.1 95 This treatment of gender is in line with the
Court's disparate treatment of sex and race discrimination in its
188. See id. at 195.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 196. During attempts at racial segregation, the problems separa-
tion caused were ignored and only grossly belatedly provided for. In Plessy v. Fer-
guson, the Supreme Court refused to take notice of the effects of racial segregation,
claiming that if "the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority," it is "solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it." See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Later, in
Brown v. Board of Education, Plessy was overruled the Court finally recognized the
harm of segregation. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
191. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1141.
192. See id. In fact, the legislative findings under VAWA were greater than those
for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Goldscheid, supra note 9, at 134.
193. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
194. See id.
195. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 286.
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Equal Protection analyses.196 The Court's implicit belittling of
the harm of sex discrimination, now expanded into Commerce
Clause analysis, further perpetuates sex discriminatory atti-
tudes.197
2. "Criminal"
The Court characterized Title III as governing action crimi-
nal in nature, then used that characterization as a transition into
a discussion of federalism, striking down the statute as an area
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.198 However, at
issue was a civil rights provision, the protection of which his-
torically has been within the purview of the federal govern-
ment.199
Recall the stated purpose of Title III to "protect the civil
rights of victims of gender motivated violence.., by establish-
ing a [flederal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of
violence motivated by gender." 200 This provision allows victims
of gender-motivated violence to sue to recover compensatory
and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory re-
lief.201 The majority in Morrison never addressed the fact that Ti-
tle III was a civil remedy, not a criminal one.202 Further, a
claimant may assert a claim under the statute regardless of
whether she files a criminal claim. 20 3 However, the majority lik-
ened Title III to the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez, which
made it a crime to possess a firearm in a school zone, the viola-
tion of which could result in a federal prison sentence. 20 4 Spe-
cifically, the Court said that Lopez, as the most recent Supreme
Court case dealing with this aspect of Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, provided the "proper framework" for analyzing Title
111.205 The majority in Morrison failed to discuss the difference be-
tween the remedies provided by these two statutes, one being
criminal (prison), the other civil (damages or equitable relief).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. "The regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence.., has always been the province of the states." Id.
199. See Joondeph, supra note 120, at 1809.
200. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002).
201. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 174.
202. See id. at 193.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
204. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 180, 190.
204. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 671 (1995).
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Therefore the Court's adherence to Lopez was erroneous in this
respect. 206
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute at issue in Morrison did
regulate activity criminal in nature, that alone should not have
kept the Court from finding it suitable for federal regulatory
power. In opposition by some federal judges, the federalization
of criminal law 207 is now a significant part of the federal system,
leaving little in the area of criminal law that Congress has not or
could not regulate.208 For example, in Perez v. United States,209
the Court upheld a federal statute criminalizing local loanshark-
ing under the Commerce Clause.210 If a violent result is the
proper object of regulation in that case, it should be proper in
other cases as well. 21' As seen in Morrison, the Court chose to
treat violence against women differently. The choice to stop the
flood of federalization in (allegedly) criminal law at gender-
based violence reflects a bias against women's claims.212
Another challenge to Congress' Commerce Clause power
more recently reached the Supreme Court in Solid Waste Agency
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.213 In the opinion, the
Court used the canon of constitutional doubt to construe the
Clean Water Act as not violating the "migratory bird rule." 214
This canon reflects the idea that if there are two possible read-
ings of congressional legislation, one constitutional and one not,
the constitutional one is assumed to be what Congress in-
tended.215 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that if otherwise con-
strued, the Act would raise a serious question as to whether
Congress had exceeded its commerce power.216 It was unclear in that
case why the Court saw the province of the migratory bird rule
as "land and water use" instead of "environmental protection,"
an area historically regulated by Congress. 217 Similarly, it was
unclear why the Court would deem Title III within criminal law
206. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 190.
207. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1147.
208. See id. (citations omitted).
209. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
210. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 190-91.
211. See id.
212. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1147.
213. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
214. See Joondeph, supra note 120, at 1809.
215. See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 173 (2001).
216. See id.
217. See Joondeph, supra note 120, at 1809.
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instead of civil rights.218 Tellingly, the Chief Justice did not in-
voke the canon of constitutional doubt in Morrison.
3. "Family Law"
When VAWA was first proposed, Chief Justice Rehnquist
spoke out against it, warning that it "could involve federal
courts in a whole host of domestic disputes."219 In the Morrison
opinion, the Chief Justice further characterized the economic and
commercial effects Congress found during four years of research
and legislative hearings as a "serious impact... on victims and
their families"220 when discussing the legislative findings that
Morrison had as support, unlike Lopez. However, Congress did
not spend four years studying what effects gender motivated
violence had upon victims and their families. Rather, Congress
examined the effects such violence had upon interstate com-
merce,221 such as the fact that almost 50% of rape victims lose
their jobs or are forced to quit because of the crime's severity.222
The Morrison majority discounted the congressional findings,
mischaracterizing them as "private" and decided that questions
of the character of such findings could "be settled finally only by
this court" 223 in one fell swoop.224
Title III is not a family law statute. Further, the domestic-
relations exception to federal court jurisdiction is limited to di-
vorce, alimony, equitable distribution of property, and child cus-
tody decrees, 225 areas specifically excluded from VAWA.226
However, opponents of VAWA have used the fact that the stat-
218. See id.
219. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 186.
220. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (emphasis added).
"In contrast with the lack of findings that we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is supported by
numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence
has on victims and their families." See id.
221. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
numerous Congressional findings).
222. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634 (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (citing Ellis,
Atkeson, & Calhoun, An Assessment of Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCH., No. 3, p. 264 (1981))).
223. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 614 (quoting Lopez and Heart of Atlanta Motel).
224. This is a far cry from the rational basis test of Commerce Clause precedent.
See Joondeph, supra note 120, at 1808. At no point in either opinion (Lopez or Morri-
son), did the Court ask if Congress had a rational basis for deciding that activity at
issue affected interstate commerce. Instead, they decided each upon an assumption
that it was a decision for the Court de novo. See id.
225. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1144.
226. See id. (footnote omitted).
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ute was limited in this manner as evidence of the danger of the
statute's influence on family law. 227 These arguments reflect bi-
ased assumptions about women and seek to reaffirm the pri-
vate/public dichotomy under the guise of federalism.228
The farthest reach of such bias is seen in the attitudes of
judges who construe the sexual contact between the rapist and
victim as an intimate relationship in itself.229 By viewing not
only marriage, but also many other kinds of relationships, as
domestic, private, and therefore less susceptible to legal scru-
tiny, the law fails to protect women from exactly the type of vio-
lence they are most likely to experience. 230 Moreover, because
violence occurs within a marriage does not transform it auto-
matically into a family law issue.231 Even if the victim was or
had been married to her abuser, it is the nature of the claim, not
the nature of the relationship between the parties, which dictates
jurisdiction. 232 In Morrison, the facts were farther removed from
the "family," as the act at issue was a gang rape by strangers at a
public university, making application of family law wrong as a
matter of law and inappropriate as a matter of justice.233
C. Discriminatory Timing of the Change in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence
Citing similarities to the Lopez analysis, one commentator
postulated that Morrison was granted certiorari to reinforce the
congressional boundaries set in Lopez, as many courts had not
followed them.234 However, another commented that Morrison
might well have been decided before it ever reached the Su-
227. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 75; Vaughan, supra note 20, at 186. The lower
court judge in Brzonkala I also commented on the possibility of regulation of "family
law" in the federal courts as he declared Title III unconstitutional, noting that vio-
lence against women is a "troubling aspect of American life," but one that Congress
could not regulate. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1136-37 n.95.
228. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 186 (quoting McTaggart, supra note 5, at
1143).
229. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 24.
230. See id.
231. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1144.
232. See id. at 1145.
233. See id. In addition, of the eighteen cases prior to Morrison in the lower
courts, only five were between currently or formerly married couples. See Goldfarb,
supra note 61, at 78 n.308.
234. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 165-66. In fact, after Lopez, but before Morri-
son reached the Supreme Court, several lower courts validated Morrison under a
Lopez analysis. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 78 n.308.
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preme Court.235 The latter seems a more likely possibility, con-
sidering the timeline of events relevant to the Morrison decision.
In 1990, the concept of VAWA was born.236 In 1991, Chief
Justice Rehnquist vehemently spoke out against the statute.237 In
1994, VAWA was enacted. 238 That same year, lower courts be-
gan to uphold the statute.239 In 1995, U.S. v. Lopez was decided
upon writ of certiorari, in an opinion written by the Chief Jus-
tice, changing the standard for Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.240 From 1995 to 1999, lower courts continued to uphold
VAWA.241 In 1999, the Fourth Circuit was the first appellate
court to reject Title III of VAWA. 242 In 2000, Morrison went to the
Supreme Court on writ of certiorari and was struck down in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.243
The combination of Rehnquist's view that a woman's civil
right to be free from gender-motivated violence is "domestic re-
lations" and the timing of the Lopez decision relative to VAWA's
enactment suggest that the Chief Justice had VAWA in mind
when deciding Lopez.244 This forward-looking activity is what is
sometimes called "planting favorable precedent,"245 marking an
important shift in the way the Court characterizes the right at is-
sue in anticipation of future cases.246
It is doubtful that this change in Commerce Clause juris-
prudence was necessary to limit congressional power as the
Court desired. 247 When Lopez came to the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had stuck down the Gun-
235. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 186.
236. See id. at 173.
237. See id. at 186.
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002).
239. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 59-60 n.308.
240. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 186.
241. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 59-60 n.308.
242. See id.
243. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
244. See Vaughan, supra note 20, at 186. "Morrison may well have been decided
before it ever reached the Supreme Court." Id.
245. See Professor Bradley W. Joondeph, Lecture at Santa Clara University
School of Law (Nov. 20, 2001).
246. See id. For example, when Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), was de-
cided, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was just one year from being decided, and
there is no doubt that Justice Brennan knew that Roe was coming. See id. Interest-
ingly, a similar timeline can be seen with respect to the Equal Protection aspect of
VAWA and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), with respect to a shift in
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. See Goldfarb, supra note 61, at 77-78.
247. See generally Joondeph, supra note 120.
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Free School Zone Act, but for a different reason.248 The appeals
court struck down the statute based on a lack of congressional
findings indicating an adequate connection to interstate com-
merce.249 In taking on the case and reviewing it de novo, the Su-
preme Court did not ask the question, "Did the lower court err?"
but rather, "Was the law substantially related to interstate com-
merce?" 250 These questions set the stage to change the analysis
used during sixty years of Commerce Clause precedent. 251
Had the Court maintained the established standard of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Lopez would likely have had
the same result because of sparse legislative findings, but the re-
sult in Morrison certainly would have been different. The Court
openly admitted that Morrison had significant legislative find-
ings that Lopez lacked.252 Consequently, it was important to
change the "affects" test in Lopez to get the result Rehnquist had
advocated, namely, to set a precedent that lower courts could
follow to strike down VAWA as unconstitutional.
D. The Role Played by Systems of Privilege
Rehnquist could not strike down Title III alone. Morrison
was a 5-4 decision, with the Court split along the same lines as it
split in Lopez.253 Four of the five justices comprising the majority
fell on the side of the Morrison decision that could easily be pre-
dicted from precedent, and four other justices ruled in a manner
consistent with their past decisions.254  However, Justice
O'Connor's take on the case was less predictable. O'Connor has
previously taken a stand for women's rights and the problem of
domestic violence as seen in the decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,255 which she co-authored. 256 That opinion spoke of a
woman's ability to choose her destiny and place in society, 257 af-
firmed that women do not lose their constitutionally protected




252. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
253. See id. at 598.
254. Chief Justice Rehnquist openly spoke out against VAWA. See Vaughan, su-
pra note 20, at 186. Further, the Chief Justice along with Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Kennedy, believe that even Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), should be over-
turned. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 669.
255. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
256. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 670.
257. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
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rights when they marry, 2 8 and noted the prevalence of domestic
abuse, both physical and psychological.25 9 A comparison of Ca-
sey and Morrison exposes a seeming contradiction in the first
woman Supreme Court justice's jurisprudence.
In an effort to effectuate positive change for women,
O'Connor may have fallen into what is commonly known as the
essentialist trap.260 The criticism of essentialist gender critiques
is that first men, and then women of relative power (in terms of
access to means of publication) within the women's movement,
have used their platforms to explain, and therefore negate, erase,
or appropriate the experiences of those unlike themselves. 261
Many feminists have suggested that a notion of multiple con-
sciousnesses is necessary to any analysis of gender. 262 Identity is
made of fragments of experience, 263 often inseparable in the in-
dividual; this concept has been likened to that of a Koosh ball.264
Failing to recognize these many fragments co-existing within the
individual clouds the picture of the whole Koosh ball, where
multiple strands interrelate.265
Such a failure to recognize different "strands" of privilege is
one explanation for the seeming contradiction in Justice
O'Connor's decisions. Although the Justice is in the non-
privileged position of being female, she is also in a position of
258. See id. at 897-98.
259. See id. at 891-93.
260. Essentialism is often understood as the overgeneralizations that attribute to
all members of a group the characteristics of a dominant subset of that group.
However, we live in a world where people are not oppressed only, or even primar-
ily, on the basis of gender, but also on the bases of class, race, sexual orientation, or
other categories, often inseparable because they simultaneously occur in one per-
son. See Wildman, supra note 62, at 1811 (quoting KATHERINE T. BARTLETT &
ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-09
(2d ed. 1998)). See also supra note 123.
261. See Resnik, supra note 115, at 1538.
262. See Harris, supra note 101, at 587.
263. See id. at 613.
264. See WILDMAN WITH ARMSTRONG, DAVIS AND GRILLO, supra note 30, at 22-23.
The Koosh ball is a popular children's toy. Although it is called a ball and
that category leads one to imagine a firm, round object used for catching
and throwing, the Koosh ball is neither hard nor firm. Picture hundreds of
rubber bands, tied in the center. Mentally cut the end of each band. The
wriggling, unfirm mass in your hand is a Koosh ball, still usable for throw-
ing and catching, but changing shape as it sails through the air or as the
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privilege as a member of the country's highest judiciary. As a
woman, she is concerned about women's place in society,266
maintaining rights upon marriage, and the problem of domestic
abuse. However, as a well-educated white woman in a powerful
position, she may have little personal concern for issues that
disproportionately affect women in less privileged groups. 26 7
Those with privilege rarely recognize it as such.268 As a woman
with the privilege (and power) to make important decisions, Jus-
tice O'Connor may have negated the experiences of women
unlike herself in her efforts to effectuate positive change for
women.
The irony is that Justice O'Connor, one of the first women
who deserves credit for helping put women's issues on the judi-
cial agenda,269 was likely unaware of the discriminatory effect of
her vote. Certain patterns of behavior are so integrated into our
society, such as accepting the private/public dichotomy, that
discriminatory acts are often done unconsciously, and we do not
immediately perceive them as discriminatory. 270 By forbidding
violence against women de jure but permitting it de facto, the law
has done little to reduce the frequency of such crimes and has
conveyed the inaccurate impression that they are rare and devi-
ant.271
V. PROPOSAL
"Equality is our aspiration, the goal in our culture, but the
fact is that our world does not treat [all] people.., alike. Our di-
lemma is how to move from a world where we know the reality
is non-equal treatment to the world of our aspirations." 272
The Supreme Court, as the highest court of the nation,
needs to take steps to remedy discrimination and prevent fur-
ther reinforcement of existing discrimination. This process calls
for a change in the way the Justices perceive discrimination in
266. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
267. Black women, for example. During slavery rape of a black woman by any
man was not considered a crime, see Harris, supra note 101, at 599 (citing Jennifer
Wrigins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 118 (1983)), and after
the Civil War, rape laws were seldom used to protect black women, since they were
seen as promiscuous by nature. See id.
268. See Wildman, supra note 62, at 1806.
269. See Resnik, supra note 115, at 1540.
270. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 304.
271. See Goldfarb, supra note 60, at 40 (footnote omitted).
272. See WILDMAN WITH ARMSTRONG, DAVIS AND GRILLO, supra note 30, at 173.
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general. The problem in the Supreme Court's current analysis of
sex stereotyping is that it examines only discrimination and ig-
nores privilege.273 The first step is to uncover systems of privi-
lege by recognizing and naming their harms. 274 The very danger
of systems of privilege is that they are elusive and fugitive, de-
riving power from their invisibility. 275 It is difficult to fight that
which is invisible, which is why revealing systems of privilege
(plural) is crucial to any attempt to combat them.276 An analysis
that goes beyond stereotyping is necessary to examine the gen-
der power system and how decisions based on it harm
women.
277
The nation needs a judicial commitment to end sex dis-
crimination against women278 equal to the commitment dis-
played by the legislature. 279 The judiciary must remember that it
is women who have been historically discriminated against.280
They must question seemingly neutral laws, with each justice
keeping his or her own respective place of privilege in mind.
The justices must ask themselves whether their respective deci-
sions truly are based on case precedent, or informed, in part, by
traditional ideas about women's roles. If the Court insignia of
"equal justice under law" is to mean anything, legislation to
achieve full participation in all aspects of society by all people281
must not be set aside lightly. A participatory perspective, aimed
at ensuring full societal participation, would accomplish that
goal.282
From the standpoint of Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
eliminating the "economic/non-economic" (or any other arbi-
trary) dichotomy is a starting point. A return to the true mean-
ing of the "substantial affects" prong is desirable, through
asking whether the activity regulated has a substantial effect on
273. See id. at 39.
274. See Wildman, supra note 62, at 1851.
275. See id. at 1805 (internal quotations omitted).
276. See id. See also WILDMAN WITH ARMSTRONG, DAVIS AND GRILLO, supra note
30, at 7, 17.
277. See WILDMAN WITH ARMSTRONG, DAVIS AND GRILLO, supra note 30, at 7, 17.
278. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 307.
279. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002).
280. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 307.
281. See Vaughan, supra note 19, at 173 (citing Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 2 (2000) (citing numerous congressional hearings over the four-year period
1990-94)).
282. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 306.
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interstate commerce. This standard, supported by adequate leg-
islative findings, would allow precedent to be maintained with-
out the strained reading the Court applied in Morrison. Under
this proposal, the statute in Lopez still would be held unconstitu-
tional due to the lack of legislative findings to support the stat-
ute, but the statute in Morrison, as well as other statutes with
sufficient legislative findings, would be upheld.
If the Court desires less deference to Congress, it must limit
congressional power in a manner that is not discriminatory, and
that is permitted under the U.S. Constitution. Further, the Court
must give some weight to congressional findings, especially
those with four years of hearings and studies supporting them.
Finally, the Court must aim for a stronger recognition of
women's true role in commerce and the market, a proper valua-
tion of women's work, and a recognition of the reality of the
economic impact of violence on women. If the legal system
places accurate values on these roles and harms, discrimination
will automatically cease to exist. The quote from the beginning
of this comment stated, "If Congress... enacted legislation that
mandated an end to sexual discrimination, the Court would
have to be less ambivalent." 283 Unfortunately, this prediction
has turned out to be not entirely accurate.2 84 Congress has taken
the first step in recognizing the harms of discrimination against
women through violence.2 85 Now the Court needs to follow suit.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the United States, violence by men against women kills
thousands each year.286 Yet, relatively few of those who commit
these violent acts are ever brought to justice287 because the courts
of this nation take the harm of violence against women less seri-
ously than other crimes.288 The analysis of Title III of VAWA in
U.S. v. Morrison stands as an example of the severity and conse-
quences of such discrimination.289 The majority opinion in Mor-
rison uncovers the failure of the judiciary to recognize systematic
283. See id. at 305.
284. See supra Part IV.
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
286. See supra note 2.
287. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 634 (2000) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing).
288. See Vaughan, supra note 19, at 165.
289. See supra Part IV.
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discrimination as a problem and exemplifies the systems of
privilege operating to reinforce such discrimination.290
As noted in the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey, 2 91 the old notions of women having no legal existence sepa-
rate from their husbands are "no longer consistent with our
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitu-
tion."292 Yet courts continue to be venues of discrimination,293
with a tendency to assume that all cases concerning women are
really about the family.294 Treating violence against women as
"family law," 295 characterizing a civil rights statute as "criminal"
in nature,296 and setting up standards that are inherently dis-
criminatory to women 297 are blatant forms of discrimination that
the Court may allow, but not while claiming to uphold the na-
tion's Constitution.298 These mistaken characterizations are what
ultimately disqualify Title III under the majority opinion in Mor-
rison,299 and they legitimate and perpetuate sex discriminatory
attitudes.300
Only when the Supreme Court recognizes its position of
privilege and takes steps to remedy discrimination by recogniz-
ing and naming the harms at issue, questioning seemingly neu-
tral laws, and asking if each decision furthers the claim of "equal
justice under law" 301 can we realize the sentiment set forth by
the plurality opinion in Casey. "The Constitution protects all in-
dividuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse
of governmental power."302
290. See id.
291. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
292. See id. at 897.
293. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 305.
294. See Goldfarb, supra note 60, at 46.
295. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
296. See id. at 617.
297. See supra Part IV.
298. See Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 134.
299. See McTaggart, supra note 5, at 1123.
300. See Wildman, supra note 1, at 304.
301. See supra Part V.
302. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992) (emphasis
added).
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